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30. Foreign Policy and Naval Power
he administration of Mr. Jefferson in relation to foreign powers was based upon the broad principles of his inaugural maxim: "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." His opinions on commerce were the same as those inculcated in his report in 1793, and they were such as continued to be sanctioned by the successive administrations. The ports of the United States were declared open to all nations without distinction, and the unmolested enjoyment of the ocean as the common theatre of navigation was claimed as an inviolable right. Freedom was offered for freedom, and prohibition was opposed to prohibition with every nation on the globe. A free system of commerce that should leave to nations the exchange of mutual surpluses for mutual wants on the basis of easy and exact reciprocity was his desire; but if any nation, deceived by calculations of interest into a contrary system, should defeat that wish, his determination was fixed to meet inequalities abroad by countervailing inequalities at home as the only effectual weapon of coercion and of self-protection. With regard to treaties, it was the system of the President to have none with any nation as far as could be avoided.
The United States were not in a situation to command reciprocal advantages, and to none other would he succumb by a written compact. The existing treaties, therefore, were permitted to expire without renewal, and all overtures for treaty with other nations were declined. He believed also that with nations as with individuals, dealings might be carried on as advantageously -- perhaps more so -- while their continuance depended on voluntary and reciprocal good treatment, as when fixed by a permanent contract which, if it became injurious to either party, was made by forced constructions to mean what suited them and became a cause of war instead of a bond of peace. He had a perfect horror of everything like connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe. They were governed by so many false principles that he deemed a temporary acquiescence under these preferable to entangling ourselves with them by alliances extorted from our present incapacity on the water. Peace and a recovery from debt were now our most important interests. "If we can delay but for a few years," he wrote to an American minister, "the necessity of vindicating the laws of nature on the ocean, we shall be the more sure of doing it with effect. The day is within my time as well as yours when we may say by what laws other nations shall treat us on the sea. And we will say it. In the meantime, we wish to let every treaty we have drop off without renewal." (to William Short, Oct. 3, 1801. Emphasis added. ME 10:287) With regard to the British government in particular, he had so little confidence that they would voluntarily retire from their habitual wrongs in the impressment of our seamen that without an express stipulation to that effect, he was satisfied we ought never to tie up our hands by treaty from the right of passing non-importation or non-intercourse acts to make it their interest to become just.
Out of this keen sensibility to maritime injuries, a transaction arose which afforded a pretext for torrents of abuse upon the President. A committee of the Senate called on him with two resolutions of that body on the subject of impressment and spoliations by Great Britain, and urged the importance of an extraordinary mission to demand satisfaction. The President was averse to the measure. The members of the other house applied to him individually and represented the responsibility which a failure to obtain redress would throw on him while pursuing a course in opposition to the opinion of nearly every member of the legislature. He found it necessary at length to yield to the general sense of the legislative body, and accordingly nominated Mr. Monroe as minister extraordinary to join Mr. Pinckney at the British Court. Explicit instructions were given them to conclude no treaty without a specific article guarding against impressments. After a tedious negotiation, they succeeded in concluding a treaty -- the best, probably, that could be procured -- but containing no provision against future aggressions on our seamen, which was made an express sine qua non in their instructions. There was no excuse for such an omission, for on receiving information from our negotiators that they had it in their power to sign such a treaty, the President in return had apprised them that should it be forwarded, it could not be ratified, and he recommended a resumption of negotiations for inserting the stipulation in question. The treaty came to hand exactly in the exceptionable shape which the administration had predetermined against. The President rejected it on his own responsibility and transmitted instructions to put the treaty into an acceptable form if practicable; otherwise to back out of the negotiation as well as they could.
Besides the abandonment of the principle which was the great object of the extraordinary mission, there were other material objections to the treaty which were such as to justify the President in rejecting it. The British commissioners appeared to have strained every article as far as it would bear, to have surrendered nothing and taken everything. There was but a single article in the treaty, the expunging of which would have left such a preponderance of evil in all the others as to have made it worse than no treaty; and even that article admitted only our right to enjoy the indirect colonial trade during the present hostilities. If peace were made that year and war resumed the next, the benefit of this stipulation would be gone: and yet we would be bound for ten years to pass no non-importation or non-intercourse laws, nor take any other measures to restrain the usurpations of the "Leviathan of the ocean." And to crown the whole, a protestation was annexed by the British ministers at the time of the signature, the effect of which was to leave that government free to consider it a treaty or no treaty according to their own convenience, while it bound the United States finally and unconditionally.
This proceeding of the President was considered a fatal error by the opponents of the administration, and many sensible republicans were inclined to the opinion that he should have consulted the coordinate branch of the treaty-making power on the question of rejection. But the Constitution had made the concurrence of both branches necessary to the confimation, not to the rejection of a treaty; and where that instrument has confided independent matters to either department of government, it is the right and duty of such department to decide independently as to the course it shall pursue. Mr. Jefferson acted upon this construction, and the same principle has been recognized in repeated instances under Federalist and Republican administrations. The leading principle of the Constitution evidently is the independence of the legislature, executive, and judiciary of each other; and the utmost jealousy should be exercised by each to prevent either of the others from becoming a despotic branch. This was the deliberate opinion of Mr. Jefferson on which he always acted and declared he would act, and that he would maintain it with the powers of the government against any control which might be attempted by the judiciary or legislature in subversion of his right to move independently in his peculiar province. Examples in which this position has been maintained -- and sufficient to establish its soundness -- have abounded in the practice of the government.
"I have long entertained scruples about writing this letter upon a subject of some delicacy. But old age has overcome them at last.
You remember the four ships ordered by Congress to be built and the four captains appointed by Washington -- Talbot and Truxton and Barry, etc. -- to carry an ambassador to Algiers and protect our commerce in the Mediterranean. I have always imputed this measure to you for several reasons. First, because you frequently proposed it to me while we were at Paris negotiating together for peace with the Barbary powers. Secondly, because I knew that Washington and Hamilton were not only indifferent about a navy, but averse to it. There was no Secretary of the Navy; only four heads of department. You were Secretary of State; Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury; Knox, Secretary of War; and I believe Bradford was Attorney General. I have always suspected that you and Knox were in favor of a navy. If Bradford was so, the majority was clear. But Washington, I am confident, was against it in his judgment. But his attachment to Knox and his deference to your opinion -- for I know he had a great regard for you -- might induce him to decide in favor of you and Knox, even though Bradford united with Hamilton in opposition to you. That Hamilton was averse to the measure, I have personal evidence; for while it was pending, he came in a hurry and a fit of impatience to make a visit to me. He said he was likely to be called upon for a large sum of money to build ships of war to fight the Algerines, and he asked my opinion of the measure. I answered him that I was clearly in favor of it. For I had always been of opinion from the commencement of the Revolution that a navy was the most powerful, the safest, and the cheapest national defense for this country. My advice, therefore, was that as much of the revenue as could possibly be spared should be applied to the building and equipping of ships. The conversation was of some length, but it was manifest in his looks and in his air that he was disgusted at the measure as well as at the opinion that I had expressed.
"Mrs. Knox not long since wrote a letter to Doctor Waterhouse requesting him to procure a commission for her son in the navy. 'That navy,' says her ladyship, 'of which his father was the parent.' 'For,' says she, 'I have frequently heard General Washington say to my husband, The navy was your child.' I have always believed it to be Jefferson's child, though Knox may have assisted in ushering it into the world. Hamilton's hobby was the army. That Washington was averse to a navy, I had full proof from his own lips in many different conversations, some of them of length, in which he always insisted that it was only building and arming ships for the English. 'Si quid novisti rectius istis, candidus imperti; si non, his utere mecum.'" (Oct. 15, 1822. ME 15:397)
Mr. Jefferson's reply:
"I have racked my memory and ransacked my papers to enable myself to answer the enquiries of your favor of October the 15th, but to little purpose. My papers furnish me nothing; my memory, generalities only. I know that while I was in Europe and anxious about the fate of our seafaring men, for some of whom then in captivity in Algiers we were treating, and all were in like danger, I formed, undoubtingly, the opinion that our government as soon as practicable should provide a naval force sufficient to keep the Barbary States in order; and on this subject we communicated together, as you observe. When I returned to the United States and took part in the administration under General Washington, I constantly maintained that opinion; and in December, 1790, took advantage of a reference to me from the first Congress which met after I was in office to report in favor of a force sufficient for the protection of our Mediterranean commerce; and I laid before them an accurate statement of the whole Barbary force, public and private. I think General Washington approved of building vessels of war to that extent. General Knox I know did. But what was Colonel Hamilton's opinion, I do not in the least remember. Your recollections on that subject are certainly corroborated by his known anxieties for a close connection with Great Britain, to which he might apprehend danger from collisions between their vessels and ours. Randolph was then Attorney General; but his opinion on the question I also entirely forget. Some vessels of war were accordingly built and sent into the Mediterranean. The additions to these in your time I need not note to you, who are well known to have ever been an advocate for the wooden walls of Themistocles. Some of those you added were sold under an Act of Congress passed while you were in office. I thought afterwards that the public safety might require some additional vessels of strength to be prepared and in readiness for the first moment of a war; provided they could be preserved against the decay which is unavoidable if kept in the water, and clear of the expense of officers and men. With this view, I proposed that they should be built in dry docks above the level of the tide waters and covered with roofs. I further advised that places for these docks should be selected where there was a command of water on a high level, as that of the Tiber at Washington, by which the vessels might be floated out on the principle of a lock. But the majority of the legislature was against any addition to the navy, and the minority, although for it in judgment, voted against it on a principle of opposition. We are now, I understand, building vessels to remain on the stocks under shelter until wanted, when they will be launched and finished. On my plan, they could be in service at an hour's notice. On this, the finishing after launching will be a work of time.
This is all I recollect about the origin and progress of our navy. That of the late war certainly raised our rank and character among nations. Yet a navy is a very expensive engine. It is admitted that in ten or twelve years a vessel goes to entire decay; or if kept in repair, costs as much as would build a new one; and that a nation who could count on twelve or fifteen years of peace would gain by burning its navy and building a new one in time. Its extent, therefore, must be governed by circumstances. Since my proposition for a force adequate to the practices of the Mediterranean, a similar necessity has arisen in our own seas for considerable addition to that force. Indeed, I wish we could have a convention with the naval powers of Europe for them to keep down the pirates of the Mediterranean and the slave ships on the coast of Africa, and for us to perform the same duties for the society of nations in our seas. In this way, those collisions would be avoided between the vessels of war of different nations which beget wars and constitute the weightiest objection to navies. I salute you with constant affection and respect." (Nov. 1, 1822. ME 15:400)
It appears that the only difference of opinion between these illustrious statesmen on the subject of a navy was as to the extent to which it should be carried. Mr. Adams was for a heavy establishment, ready at all time and sufficient to compete with that of the most powerful nation on the water the moment it should become our adversary. Mr. Jefferson thought that its extent should always be regulated by circumstances, and this is probably the republican doctrine. Being a very expensive engine both in its first creation and in its maintenance against the unavoidable ravages of time, he was for restraining it in time of peace to a force sufficient only for the protection of our commerce, and for confining all naval preparations against the contingency of war to the building of ships in dry docks where they could be kept free from decay, from the expense of officers and men, and ready at any moment for actual service.
n addition to the incompetency of our resources to maintain a powerful navy, other and weighty objections existed at this time which always had great influence on the mind of the President. The inevitable multiplication of habitual violations of natural right in the form of impressments and the collisions from other sources designed to embroil us continually with the nations whom we could indeed master on the land, were sensible reasons against exhausting our strength on a navy and transferring the scene of combat to a theatre where the enemy were omnipotent and we were nothing. To these might perhaps be added equality in the distribution of the public burden -- a favorite principle of administration with the President. One portion of the union whose contributions were least would be elevated to greatness and wealth, to the depression of another portion, whose contributions were greatest and pecuniary remuneration comparatively little. If there was error in this consideration, it was founded in a too great anxiety for the good of the whole rather than an undue influence of sectional feeling, of which a suspicion could scarcely find place, even in the credulity of his enemies.
The plan for the establishment of dry docks in pursuance of his naval system was always a fruitful theme of raillery against the President; and yet, it is somewhat surprising that the principle should have since been sanctioned by the government and have obtained the approbation of the greatest maritime powers in Europe. A plan agreeing in its chief features with that of Mr. Jefferson, though inferior to it in others, has since been adopted both in this country and in Europe for preventing ships from early decay by keeping them out of the water and protecting them from the weather. The most prodigal and aristocratic governments on the globe have now become converts to a practice which, it was alleged, originated in parsimony and ignorance.
The use of gunboats, which composed a part of the naval system recommended by the President, has received an unlimited measure of condemnation at the hands of his political opponents. They were principally intended in connection with land batteries for the defense of our harbors and sea-port towns. The outlines of the plan are exhibited in the following statement of the President:
"If we cannot hinder vessels from entering our harbors, we should turn our attention to the putting it out of their power to lie, or come to, before a town, to injure it. Two means of doing this may be adopted in aid of each other. 1. Heavy cannon on traveling carriages, which may be moved to any point on the bank or beach most convenient for dislodging the vessel. A sufficient number of these should be lent to each sea-port town, and their militia trained to them. The executive is authorized to do this; it has been done in a smaller degree and will now be done more competently.
"2. Having cannon on floating batteries or boats which may be so stationed as to prevent a vessel entering the harbor or force her after entering to depart. There are about fifteen harbors in the United States which ought to be in a state of substantial defense. The whole of these would require, according to the best opinions, two hundred and forty gunboats. Their cost was estimated by Captain Rodgers at two thousand dollars each; but we had better say four thousand dollars. The whole would cost one million of dollars. But we should allow ourselves ten years to complete it, unless circumstances should force it sooner. There are three situations in which the gunboat may be. 1. Hauled up under a shed in readiness to be launched and manned by the seamen and militia of the town on short notice. In this situation, she costs nothing but an enclosure or a sentinel to see that no mischief is done to her. 2. Afloat, and with men enough to navigate her in harbor and take care of her, but depending on receiving her crew from the town on short warning. In this situation, her annual expense is about two thousand dollars, as by an official estimate at the end of this letter. 3. Fully manned for action. Her annual expense in this situation is about eight thousand dollars, as per estimate subjoined. When there is a general peace, we should probably keep about six or seven afloat in the second situation; their annual expense twelve to fourteen thousand dollars; the rest all hauled up. When France and England are at war, we should keep at the utmost twenty-five in the second situation, their annual expense fifty thousand dollars. When we should be at war ourselves, some of them would probably be kept in the third situation at an annual expense of eight thousand dollars; but how many must depend on the circumstances of the war. We now possess ten, built and building. It is the opinion of those consulted that fifteen more would enable us to put every harbor under our view into a respectable condition; and that this should limit the views of the present year. This would require an appropriation of sixty thousand dollars, and I suppose that the best way of limiting it without declaring the number, as perhaps that sum would build more." (to Joseph H. Nicholson, Jan 29, 1805. ME 11:60)
In the Mediterranean, the superiority of the gunboats for harbor service has been illustrated by experience. Algiers is known to have owed the safety of its city since the epoch of their construction, to these vessels. Before that, it had been repeatedly insulted and injured. The effect of gunboats in the neighborhood of Gibraltar is well known, and how much they were used both in the attack and defense of that place during a former war. The remarkable action between the Russian flotilla of gunboats and galleys and a Turkish fleet of ships of the line and frigates in the Liman sea in 1788 is a matter of historical record. The latter were completely defeated and several of their ships of the line destroyed. There is not, it is believed, a maritime nation in Europe which has not adopted the same species of armament for the defense of some of its harbors: the English and the French certainly have; by the northern powers of the continent whose seas are particularly adapted to them, they were still more used; and the only occasion on which Admiral Nelson was ever foiled was by the gunboats at Boulogne.
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