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29. The Louisiana Purchase
he purchase of Louisiana from France had long been a favorite object with Mr. Jefferson. He viewed it as essential to removing from the United States a source of continual and eternal collision and cause of war with the European possessor, besides securing to us the exclusive navigation of the western waters and an immeasurable region of fertile country. The territory of Louisiana was originally colonized by France. In 1762, all French territory west of the Mississippi including the island of New Orleans was ceded to Spain, and, by the general treaty of peace which followed the French and Indian War in 1763, the whole territory of France eastward of the Mississippi except the Island of Orleans was ceded to Great Britain. Under the former possession by France, the latter territory embraced what is denominated West Florida. Spain conquered this, together with East Florida, from Great Britain during the war of the American Revolution, and acquired the right to them both by the Treaty of 1783. While in the hands of Spain, the United States acquired the right to a free navigation of the Mississippi and to an entrepot at New Orleans. About this time, to wit, in 1800, Spain restored to France the whole of Louisiana according to its ancient and proper limits. This transfer was attended with a suspension of our right of deposit at New Orleans, and opened to us, in the opinion of the President, the prospect of a complete reversal of all our friendly relations with France. In view of the threatening crisis, he immediately sent Mr. Monroe as envoy extraordinary to Robert R. Livingston, Minister Resident at the French court, with instructions to negotiate the purchase of Louisiana from France. In the letter to Mr. Monroe conveying the notice of his appointment, the President said:
"All eyes, all hopes, are now fixed on you; and were you to decline, the chagrin would be universal and would shake under your feet the high ground on which you stand with the public. Indeed, I know nothing which would produce such a shock, for on the event of this mission depends the future destinies of this republic. If we cannot by a purchase of the country insure to ourselves a course of perpetual peace and friendship with all nations, then, as war cannot be distant, it behooves us immediately to be preparing for that course, without, however, hastening it, and it may be necessary (on your failure on the continent) to cross the channel.
"We shall get entangled in European politics, and figuring more, be much less happy and prosperous. This can only be prevented by a successful issue to your present mission. I am sensible after the measures you have taken for getting into a different line of business, that it will be a great sacrifice on your part and presents from the season and other circumstances serious difficulties. But some men are born for the public. Nature by fitting them for the service of the human race on a broad scale, has stamped with the evidences of her destination and their duty. (Jan. 13, 1803. ME 10:344)
The personal agency of Mr. Jefferson in this achievement was of the most laborious character. In addition to his official instructions communicated through the Secretary of State, his private letters to our ministers and to influential characters in France on whose fidelity and friendship he relied were ample testimonials of his ardor and indefatigableness in the prosecution of the enterprise. Among these was the following, addressed to Mr. Livingston.
"The cession of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain to France works most sorely on the United States. On this subject the Secretary of State has written to you fully. Yet I cannot forbear recurring to it personally, so deep is the impression it makes in my mind. It completely reverses all the political relations of the United States and will form a new epoch in our political course. Of all nations of any consideration, France is the one which hitherto has offered the fewest points on which we could have any conflict of right and the most points of a communion of interests. From these causes, we have ever looked to her as our natural friend, as one with which we never could have an occasion of difference. Her growth, therefore, we viewed as our own, her misfortunes ours. There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our whole produce and contain more than half our inhabitants. France placing herself in that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years. Her pacific dispositions, her feeble state, would induce her to increase our facilities there, so that her possession of the place would be hardly felt by us, and it would not perhaps be very long before some circumstance might arise which might make the cession of it to us the price of something of more worth to her. Not so can it ever be in the hands of France. The impetuosity of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her character placed in a point of eternal friction with us, and our character, which though quiet and loving peace and the pursuit of wealth, is high-minded, despising wealth in competition with insult or injury, enterprising and energetic as any nation on earth -- these circumstances render it impossible that France and the United States can continue long friends when they meet in so irritable a position. They as well as we must be blind if they do not see this; and we must be very improvident if we do not begin to make arrangements on that hypothesis. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of two nations who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very high grounds: and having formed and cemented together a power which may render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she may have made and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us as necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its necessary effect. It is not from a fear of France that we deprecate this measure proposed by her. For however greater her force is than ours compared in the abstract, it is nothing in comparison of ours when to be exerted on our soil. But it is from a sincere love of peace and a firm persuasion that, bound to France by the interests and the strong sympathies still existing in the minds of our citizens and holding relative positions which ensure their continuance, we are secure of a long course of peace. Whereas, the change of friends which will be rendered necessary if France changes that position embarks us necessarily as a belligerent power in the first war of Europe. In that case, France will have held possession of New Orleans during the interval of a peace, long or short, at the end of which it will be wrested from her. Will this short-lived possession have been an equivalent to her for the transfer of such a weight into the scale of her enemy? Will not the amalgamation of a young, thriving nation continue to that enemy the health and force which are at present so evidently on the decline? And will a few years possession of New Orleans add equally to the strength of France? She may say she needs Louisiana for the supply of her West Indies. She does not need it in time of peace. And in war she could not depend on them because they would be so easily intercepted. I should suppose that all these considerations might in some proper form be brought into view of the government of France. Though stated by us, it ought not to give offense because we do not bring them forward as a menace, but as consequences not controllable by us but inevitable from the course of things. We mention them not as things which we desire by any means, but as things we deprecate; and we beseech a friend to look forward and to prevent them for our common interests...
"I have no doubt you have urged these considerations on every proper occasion with the government where you are. They are such as must have effect if you can find the means of producing thorough reflection on them by that government. The idea here is that the troops sent to St. Domingo were to proceed to Louisiana after finishing their work in that island. If this were the arrangement, it will give you time to return again and again to the charge, for the conquest of St. Domingo will not be a short work. It will take considerable time to wear down a great number of soldiers. Every eye in the United States is now fixed on this affair of Louisiana. Perhaps nothing since the revolutionary war has produced more uneasy sensations through the body of the nation. Notwithstanding temporary bickerings have taken place with France, she has still a strong hold on the affections of our citizens generally. I have thought it not amiss, by way of supplement to the letters of the Secretary of State, to write you this private one to impress you with the importance we affix to this transaction. I pray you to cherish Dupont. He has the best disposition for the continuance of friendship between the two nations, and perhaps you may be able to make a good use of him." (Apr. 18, 1802. ME 10:311)
n the 30th of April, 1803, the negotiation was concluded and the entire province of Louisiana was ceded to the United States for the sum of fifteen millions of dollars. The American negotiators seized the favorable moment to urge the claims of American merchants on the French government for spoilations on their property, which were allowed to the amount of three millions, seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and the bargain was closed. This important acquisition more than doubled the territory of the United States, trebled the quantity of fertile country, secured the uncontrolled navigation of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, and opened an independent outlet for the produce of the western States free from collision with other powers and the perpetual dangers to our peace from that source. The treaty was received with approbation by the great majority of the nation. There were some, however, particularly in the eastern States, who wrote and declaimed strenuously against it. They saw in the great enlargement of our territory the seeds of a future dismemberment of the union by a separation into eastern and western confederacies. On the other hand, it was the opinion of the President that the acquisition would prove an additional bond of union rather than a cause of dismemberment; that the larger our association was, the less it would be shaken by local factions, and that no one could presume to limit the extent to which the federative principle might operate effectively. Mr. Madison maintained the same opinion in the Federalist, and experience has thereafter confirmed it. But in any view of the case, were those apocryphal dangers worthy a moment's consideration when contrasted with the certain and incalculable blessings of the conquest; when compared with advantages both positive and immediate, as well as the avoidance in the future of those interminable calamities which would have ensued from a contrary state of things? Was it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled by our own brethren and children than by strangers of adverse feelings and principles? With which of those should we have been most likely to have lived in harmony and friendly intercourse in the future?
To General Gates.-- "I accept with pleasure and with pleasure reciprocate your congratulations on the acquisition of Louisiana; for it is a subject of mutual congratulation as it interests every man of the nation. The territory acquired, as it includes all the waters of the Missouri and Mississippi, has more than doubled the area of the United States, and the new part is not inferior to the old in soil, climate, productions, and important communications. If our legislature dispose of it with the wisdom we have a right to expect, they may make it the means of tempting all our Indians on the east side of the Mississippi to remove to the West, and of condensing instead of scattering our population." (July 11, 1803. ME 10:402)
To M. Dupont de Nemours.-- "The treaty which has so happily sealed the friendship of our two countries has been received here with general acclamation. Some inflexible opponents have still ventured to brave the public opinion. For myself and my country, I thank you for the aids you have given in it, and I congratulate you on having lived to give those aids in a transaction replete with blessings to unborn millions of men, and which will mark the face of a portion on the globe so extensive as that which now composes the United States of America... Our policy will be to form New Orleans and the country on both sides of it on the Gulf of Mexico into a State, and as to all above that, to transplant our Indians into it, constituting them a Marechaussee to prevent immigrants crossing the river until we shall have filled up all the vacant country on this side. This will secure both Spain and us as to the mines of Mexico for half a century, and we may safely trust the provisions for that time to the men who shall live in it." (Nov. 1, 1803. ME 10:422)
hen the treaty arrived, the President convened Congress at the earliest day practicable for its ratification and execution. The Federalists in both houses declaimed and voted against it, but they were now so reduced in numbers as to be incapable of serious opposition. The question on its ratification in the Senate was decided by twenty-four to seven. The vote in the House of Representative for making provision for its execution was carried by eighty-nine to twenty-three. Mr. Pichon, Minister of France, proposed, according to instructions from his government, to have added to the ratification a protestation against any failure in time or other circumstances of execution on our part. He was told by the President that in that case, a counter protestation would be annexed on our part which would leave the thing exactly where it was; that the negotiation had been conducted from the commencement to its present stage with a frankness and sincerity honorable to both nations; that to annex to this last chapter of the transaction such an evidence of mutual distrust would be to change its aspect dishonorably to both parties; that we had not the smallest doubt that France would punctually execute her part. Seeing the ratification passed and the bills for execution carrying by large majorities in both houses, Mr. Pichon, like an able and honest minister, undertook to do what he knew his employers would have done with a like knowledge of the circumstances and exchanged the ratifications. Commissioners were immediately deputed to receive possession. They proceeded to New Orleans with such regular troops as were garrisoned in the nearest posts and some militia of the Mississippi territory. To be prepared for anything unexpected which might arise out of the transaction, a respectable body of militia was ordered to be in readiness in the states of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. No occasion, however, arose for their services. Our commissioners, on their arrival at New Orleans, found the province already delivered by the commissaries of Spain to that of France, who delivered it over to them on the 20th of December, 1803.
The circumstances ought not to be overlooked that this mighty acquisition, exceeding in territory the greatest monarchy in Europe, was achieved without the guilt or calamities of blood from a military autocrat whose ceaseless ambition was a universality of empire, and who, in the untamable pursuit of his purpose, went on demolishing nations at a blow and partitioning the earth at pleasure until vanquished by the consolidated power of Europe. "There is no country," wrote one writer, "like the valley of the Mississippi on the face of the globe. Follow the mighty amphitheatre of rocks that nature has heaped around it. Trace the ten thousand rivers that unite their waters in the mighty Mississippi; count the happy millions that already crowd and animate their banks, loading their channels with a mighty produce. Then see the whole, bound by the hand of nature in chains which God alone can sever to a perpetual union at one little connecting point, and by that point fastening itself by every tie of interest, consanguinity, and feeling to the remotest promontory on our Atlantic coast. A few short years have done all this, and yet ages are now before us: ages in which myriads are destined to multiply throughout its wide spread territory, extending the greatness and the happiness of our country from sea to sea. What would we have been without the acquisition of Louisiana? What were we before it? God and nature fixed the unalterable decree that the nation which held New Orleans should govern the whole of that vast region. France, Spain, and Great Britain had bent their envious eyes upon it. And their intrigues, if matured, would eventually have torn from us that vast paradise which reposes upon the western waters... Other conquests bring with them misery and oppression to the luckless inhabitant. This brought emancipation, civil and religious freedom, laws, wealth."
The practice of the art of vaccination, recommended early on to his countrymen by Mr. Jefferson, was made by him to diffuse its blessings among the Indians with an effect as astonishing as it was humane and endearing. The terrible pestilence of which this discovery proved an antidote was even more fatal in its ravages among the natives of the wilderness than in civilized society. The medical skill of their physicians had not attained even to an assuagement of its violence. Whole tribes were swept away at a blast. They opposed no other shield against its attacks than flight or the fortitude of martyrs. By the persuasions and exertions of the President, they were induced to believe in the efficacy of vaccination as a preventive. Coming from so good a father, they thought it must have been sent him from the Great Spirit, and whole nations submitted to the process of inoculation with the warmest benedictions on their benevolent protector.
These conciliatory measures of the government, with the most rigorous enactments against the intrusion of incendiaries and hostile emissaries, established and maintained a course of friendly relations with the Indians which was uninterrupted by war with any tribe during Mr. Jefferson's administration. Out of this continued state of peace and reciprocal kindness, treaties sprung up annually which secured to the United States great accessions to their territorial title. The same year of the acquisition of Louisiana was distinguished by the purchase from the Kaskaskias of that vast and fertile country extending along the Mississippi River from the mouth of the Illinois to the Ohio, which was followed the next year by the relinquishment from the Delawares of the native title to all the country between the Wabash and Ohio. These acquisitions comprehended the territory which forms the present states of Illinois and Indiana. They were soon followed by other purchases of great extent and fertility from the northern tribes and from the Chickasaws, Cherokees, and Creeks of the southern. The amount of national domain to which the native title was extinguished under Mr. Jefferson embraced nearly one hundred millions of acres. In exchange for this, with the addition of an uninterrupted peace with them, the United States had only to pay inconsiderable annuities in animals, in money, in the implements of agriculture, and to extend to them their patronage and protection.
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© 1997 by Eyler Robert Coates, Sr.