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25. Administration of Foreign Affairs
he administration of the foreign affairs of the republic devolving ex officio on the Secretary of State, the principal of his labors emanate from that source. Being the organ of communication between the government and foreign nations, the preparing and communicating instructions to our ministers of every grade at the different courts and the answering those of foreign ministers of every grade resident in the United States constitute a perpetual routine of arduous and complicated duties. Perhaps there was never a period in our history in which these duties were more onerous and multiplied than during the years 1791, '92, and '93. The United States were at issue on the most delicate points of controversy with England, France, and Spain, and the coalition of European despots against republican France drove our government into the necessity of maintaining a strict and impartial neutrality towards the belligerent parties -- perhaps the most difficult posture it had ever been called upon to assume.
With Spain, difficulties had arisen of a serious character. They concerned chiefly the navigation of the Mississippi River below our southern limit, the right to which was still withheld; the settlement of boundaries between the two nations; and the interference on the part of Spain with the tribes of Indians in our territories, inciting them to frequent and ferocious depredations on our citizens.
On all these points, the talents of the Secretary of State were constantly exercised in communicating and enforcing the opinions of the administration. On the subject of the Mississippi River, his instructions to our minister at Madrid were rigorous and uncompromising. He insisted that the United States had a right not only to the unmolested navigation of that river to its mouth, but also to an entrepot near thereto in the dominions of Spain, subject to our jurisdiction exclusively, for the convenience and protection of our commerce. He grounded these rights upon the broad principle of the law of nature: that the inhabitants on both sides of a navigable river are entitled to the common use and enjoyment of it to the ocean, and that the right to use a thing comprehends a right to all the means necessary to its use. The peculiar energy and urgency of his official communications were in unison with the high tone of American feeling which he carried into every situation.
On the subject of the boundaries between the United States and Spain and the incendiary interference of the latter with the Indians on our territories, the communications of Mr. Jefferson gave a tone to the foreign administration of the government distinguished alike for moderation and firmness. He uniformly pressed on our minister the importance of assuring the court of Spain on every occasion in respectful yet unequivocal terms that the essential principles in dispute would never be relinquished, preferring always a peaceful redress of grievances, yet fearless of war if driven to that extremity. Such, however, was the obstinacy of Spain and her jealousy of a rising power in the West, that although deprecating the possibility of war, she skillfully parried all attempts at negotiation and secretly practised her wily arts with the Indians. This temporizing and inhuman policy at length drew forth from Mr. Jefferson a bold address to the court of Spain itself, declaring the ultimate determination of the government in language equally resolute and conciliatory.
"We love and we value peace; we know its blessings from experience; unmeddling with the affairs of other nations, we had hoped that our distance and our dispositions would have left us free in the example and indulgence of peace with all the world. We had with sincere and particular dispositions courted and cultivated the friendship of Spain. Cherishing the same sentiments, we have chosen to ascribe the unfriendly insinuations of the Spanish commissioners in their intercourse with the government of the United States to the peculiar character of the writers, and to remove the cause of them from their sovereign, in whose justice and love of peace we have confidence. If we are disappointed in this appeal, if we are to be forced into a contrary order of things, our mind is made up: we shall meet it with firmness. The necessity of our position will supersede all appeal to calculation now as it had done heretofore. We confide in our own strength without boasting of it; we respect that of others without fearing it. If Spain chooses to consider our self-defense against savage butchery as a cause of war to her, we must meet her also in war, with regret but without fear; and we shall be happier to the last moment to repair with her to the tribunal of peace and reason."
The controversy with Spain on these several points was continued with unabated ardor while Mr. Jefferson remained Secretary of State. The rights in dispute were finally secured by treaty on the principles contended for by him, except that the right to an entrepot at New Orleans was limited to three years. The principle of "free bottoms, free goods" was also recognized, and the practice of privateering was humanely restrained. These were favorite ideas with Mr. Jefferson. The treaty with Spain was concluded on the 27th of October, 1795.
n the midst of the contest with Spain, the Secretary of State became involve in a diplomatic controversy with Mr. Hammond, Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain to the United States. This controversy originated in the non-execution of the treaty of peace, infractions of which in various particulars had been mutually charged by each upon the other party ever since the conclusion of the war. Mr. Jefferson directed the attention of the British minister to the subject in a pointed manner. He informed him that the British garrisons had not evacuated the western posts, in violation of an express stipulation to that effect in the seventh article of the treaty, that the British officers had exercised jurisdiction over the country and the inhabitants in the vicinity of these posts, that American citizens had been excluded from the navigation of the lakes, and that contrary to the same article, a great number of Negroes, the property of American citizens, had been carried away on the evacuation of New York.
Mr. Hammond replied by admitting the alleged infractions, but justifying them on the ground of retaliation, the United States having previously, he declared, violated their engagements by obstructing the payment of debts justly due to British creditors and by refusing to make remuneration for repeated confiscations of British property during and since the war.
To this Mr. Jefferson rejoined on the 29th of May, 1792, in a masterly communication of more than sixty pages octavo. He reviewed the whole ground of the controversy from beginning to end, sustaining his former positions and overturning those of the British minister by such arguments as drove his antagonist from the field. He showed that with respect to property confiscated by the individual States, the treaty merely stipulated that Congress should recommend to the legislatures of the several States to provide for its restitution. That Congress had done all in their power, and all they were bound by the treaty to do; that it was left with the States to comply or not, as they might think proper, with the recommendation of Congress, and that this was so understood by the British negotiators and by the British ministry at the time the treaty was concluded. He also claimed that the first infractions were on the part of Great Britain, by retaining the western posts and by the deportation of Negroes, and that the delays and impediments which had taken place in the collection of British debts were justifiable on that account.
Hammond never undertook an answer to this communication. After more than a year had elapsed without hearing anything from him, Mr. Jefferson invited his attention to the subject and requested an answer. But Hammond evaded the challenge, alleging as an excuse for his neglect that he awaited instructions from his government. In this state the matter rested until it became merged in disputes of a more serious character by the outbreak of a general war in Europe, which changed the political relations of both continents.
gainst another pretension on the part of Great Britain and one which ultimately conduced to the second war with that nation, Mr. Jefferson had the honor of offering the first formal resistance of our government. This was the impressment of seamen on board American ships under color of their being British subjects. This custom was peculiar to England; she had practiced it towards all other nations from time immemorial, but with accumulated rigor towards the United States since their independence. She claimed the absolute right of going on board American ships with her press-gangs and constraining into her service all seamen whatsoever who could not produce upon the spot written evidences of their citizenship. The consequence was that American citizens were frequently carried off and subjected to multiplied cruelties, not only without evidence, but even against evidence. In opposition to this preposterous claim, the Secretary of State proclaimed the determined voice of the government and authorized a rigorous system of reprisal unless the practice be abandoned. He contended that American bottoms should be prima facie evidence that all on board were Americans, which would throw the burden of proof where it ought to be: on those who set themselves up against natural right. Under date of June 11, 1792, he thus writes to Thomas Pinckney, our minister at London:
"We entirely reject the mode which was the subject of a conversation between Mr. Morris and him [the British minister], which was that our seamen should always carry about them certificates of their citizenship. This is a condition never yet submitted to by any nation, one with which seamen would never have the precaution to comply: the casualties of their calling would expose them to the constant destruction or loss of this paper evidence, and thus the British government would be armed with legal authority to impress the whole of our seamen. The simplest rule will be that the vessel being American shall be evidence that the seamen on board her are such. If they apprehend that our vessels might thus become asylums for the fugitives of their own nation from impressment, the number of men to be protected by a vessel may be limited by her tonnage, and one or two officers only be permitted to enter the vessel in order to examine the numbers on board; but no press-gang should be allowed ever to go on board an American vessel till after it shall be found that there are more than their stipulated number on board, nor till after the master shall have refused to deliver the supernumeraries (to be named by himself) to the press-officer who has come on board for that purpose; and even then, the American consul should be called in. In order to urge a settlement of this point before a new occasion may arise, it may not be amiss to draw their attention to the peculiar irritation excited on the last occasion and the difficulty of avoiding our making immediate reprisals on their seamen here." (ME 8:370)
On the subject of impressment, Mr. Jefferson's private opinion was that American bottoms should be conclusive evidence that all on board were American citizens, inasmuch as the right of expatriation was a natural right, the free enjoyment of which no nation had the authority to molest with respect to any other nation unless by special and mutual agreement. But the administration were not prepared at this time to carry their resistance to the pretension further than was necessary for the protection of their own seamen, without affording an asylum for others.
The frenzy of the popular excitement in favor of France was greatly increased by the intemperate character of the minister of the French republic, Mr. Genet. No sooner had this gentleman arrived in the United States than, presuming on the state of public feeling, he began the design of forcing them to become a party to the war by an extraordinary course of proceedings. He landed on the 8th of April, 1793, at Charleston, a port so remote from his points both of departure and destination as to excite attention; and instead of proceeding directly to Philadelphia and presenting his credentials to the President, he remained in Charleston five or six weeks. While there, he was constantly engaged in authorizing the fitting and arming of vessels in that port, enlisting men, foreigners and citizens, and giving them commissions to cruise and commit hostilities on the nations at war with France. These vessels were taking and bringing prizes into our ports, and the consuls of France, by his direction, were assuming to hold courts of admiralty on them, to try, condemn, and authorize their sale as legal prize. All this was done and doing before Mr. Genet had been received and accredited by the President, without the latter's consent or consultation, in defiance of an express proclamation by the American government, and in palpable contravention of the law of nations. These proceedings immediately called forth from the British minister several memorials thereon, to which Mr. Jefferson replied on the 15th of May condemning in the highest degree the transactions complained against and assuring the British minister that the United States would take the most effectual measures to prevent their repetition. Mr. Genet reached Philadelphia the next day. His progress through the country had been triumphal, and he was received at Philadelphia amidst the plaudits and acclamations of the people. On his presentation to the President, he assured him that on account of the remote situation of the United States and other circumstances, France did not expect them to become a party in the war, but wished to see them preserve their prosperity and happiness in peace. But in a conference with the Secretary of State soon after his reception, he alluded to his proceedings at Charleston and expressed a hope that the President had not absolutely decided against them. He added that he would write the Secretary a note justifying his conduct under the treaty between the two nations; but if the President should finally determine otherwise, he must submit, as his instructions enjoined him to do what was agreeable to the Americans.
In pursuance of his intimation, he addressed a letter to the Secretary of State on the 27th of May in which it appeared that he was far from possessing a disposition to acquiesce in the decisions of the American government. The letter laid the foundation of a correspondence which is confessedly unparalleled in the annals of diplomacy. The communications of Mr. Jefferson present a valuable commentary on the legal interpretation of treaties. They occupy a volume of the American State Papers, and a mere outline of them would exceed the limits prescribed to the present work.
The communications of Genet, on the other hand, were a tissue of inflammatory declamation. To the reasonings of Mr. Jefferson on the obligations of the United States to observe an impartial neutrality towards all the belligerent parties, he applied the epithet of "diplomatic subtilties." And when he sustained the principles advanced by him by quotations from Vattel and other approved jurisconsults, Genet called them "the aphorisms of Vattel," etc. "You oppose," said he, "to my complaints, to my just reclamations upon the footing of right, the private or public opinion of the President of the United States; and this aegis not appearing to you sufficient, you bring forward aphorisms of Vattel to justify or excuse infractions committed on positive treaties." And he added, "Do not punish the brave individuals of your nation who arrange themselves under our banner knowing perfectly well that no law of the United States gives to the government the sole power of arresting their zeal by acts of rigor. The Americans are free: they are not attached to the glebe like the slaves of Russia; they may change their situation when they please, and by accepting at this moment the succor of their arms in the habit of trampling on tyrants, we do not commit the plagiat [abduction] of which you speak. The true robbery, the true crime would be to enchain the courage of these good citizens, of these sincere friends of the best of causes." At other times he would address himself to the political feelings of Mr. Jefferson himself, whom he had been induced to consider his personal friend and who, he said, "had initiated him into mysteries which had inflamed his hatred against all those who aspire to an absolute power."
During the same time also, Mr. Genet was industriously engaged in disseminating seditious addresses among the people and attempting by every means in his power to inflame their passions and induce them to arise in arms against the enemies of France.
Finally, after a controversy of several months in the course of which the mingled effusions of arrogance and intemperance were opposed to a moderation and forbearance which could not be betrayed into a single undignified expression, the American government came to the determination of desiring the recall of Mr. Genet. This delicate duty was executed by Mr. Jefferson and in a manner which has doubtless united more opinions in its favor than any other diplomatic performance on record. On the 16th of August, 1793, he addressed a letter to Gouverneur Morris, the minister of the United States at Paris, containing an epitome of the correspondence on both sides, assigning the reasons which rendered the recall of Mr. Genet necessary, and directing the case to be immediately laid before the French government.
It were vain to attempt a satisfactory analysis of this letter. To a full and dispassionate review of the transactions of Mr. Genet and an unanswerable vindication of the principles upon which the administration had conducted itself in the controversy, assurances were added of an unwavering attachment to France, expressed in such terms as to impress every reader with their sincerity. The concluding paragraphs are too remarkable not to require an insertion.
After introducing a series of quotations from Mr. Genet's correspondence which he deemed too offensive to be translated into English or to merit a commentary, the author proceeded in the following dignified strain:
"We draw a veil over the sensations which these expressions excite. No words can render them; but they will not escape the sensibility of a friendly and magnanimous nation who will do us justice. We see in them neither the portrait of ourselves nor the pencil of our friends, but an attempt to embroil both, to add still another nation to the enemies of his country, and to draw on both a reproach which it is hoped will never stain the history of either. The written proofs of which Mr. Genet was himself the bearer were too unequivocal to leave a doubt that the French nation are constant in their friendship to us. The resolves of their national convention, the letters of their executive council attest this truth in terms which render it necessary to seek in some other hypothesis the solution of Mr. Genet's machinations against our peace and friendship.
"Conscious on our part of the same friendly and sincere dispositions, we can with truth affirm, both for our nation and government, that we have never omitted a reasonable occasion of manifesting them. For I will not consider as of that character, opportunities of sallying forth from our ports to way-lay, rob, and murder defenseless merchants and others who have done us no injury and who were coming to trade with us in the confidence of our peace and amity. The violation of all the laws of order and morality which bind mankind together would be an unacceptable offering to a just nation. Recurring then only to recent things after so afflicting a libel, we recollect with satisfaction that in the course of two years, by unceasing exertions, we paid up seven years' arrearages and instalments of our debt to France, which the inefficiency of our first form of government had suffered to be accumulating: that pressing on still to the entire fulfilment of our engagements, we have facilitated to Mr. Genet the effect of the instalments of the present year to enable him to send relief to his fellow citizens in France threatened with famine: that in the first moment of the insurrection which threatened the colony of St. Domingo, we stepped forward to their relief with arms and money, taking freely on ourselves the risk of an unauthorized aid when delay would have been denial: that we have received according to our best abilities the wretched fugitives from the catastrophe of the principal town of that colony who, escaping from the swords and flames of civil war, threw themselves on us naked and houseless, without food or friends, money or other means, their faculties lost and absorbed in the depth of their distresses: that the exclusive admission to sell here the prizes made by France on her enemies in the present war, though unstipulated in our treaties and unfounded in her own practice or in that of other nations as we believe; the spirit manifested by the late grand jury in their proceedings against those who had aided the enemies of France with arms and implements of war; the expressions of attachment to his nation with which Mr. Genet was welcomed on his arrival and journey from South to North, and our long forbearance under his gross usurpations and outrages of the laws and authority of our country, do not bespeak the partialities intimated in his letters. And for these things, he rewards us by endeavors to excite discord and distrust between our citizens and those whom they have entrusted with their government, between the different branches of our government, between our nation and his. But none of these things, we hope, will be found in his power. That friendship which dictates to us to bear with his conduct yet a while lest the interest of his nation here should suffer injury will hasten them to replace an agent whose dispositions are such a misrepresentation of theirs and whose continuance here is inconsistent with order, peace, respect, and that friendly correspondence which we hope will ever subsist between the two nations. His government will see too that the case is pressing. That it is impossible for two sovereign and independent authorities to be going on within our territory at the same time without collision. They will foresee that if Mr. Genet perseveres in his proceedings, the consequences would be so hazardous to us, the example so humiliating and pernicious that we may be forced even to suspend his functions before a successor can arrive to continue them. If our citizens have not already been shedding each other's blood, it is not owing to the moderation of Mr. Genet, but to the forbearance of the government."
"Lay the case, then, immediately before his government. Accompany it with assurances which cannot be stronger than true, that our friendship for the nation is constant and unabating; that faithful to our treaties, we have fulfilled them in every point to the best of our understanding; that if in anything, however, we have construed them amiss, we are ready to enter into candid explanations and to do whatever we can be convinced is right; that in opposing the extravagances of an agent whose character they seem not sufficiently to have known, we have been urged by motives of duty to ourselves and justice to others which cannot but be approved by those who are just themselves; and finally, that after independence and self-government, there is nothing we more sincerely wish than perpetual friendship with them." (ME 9:205)
This appeal to the justice and magnanimity of France was successful. Genet was recalled and his place supplied by Mr. Fauchet, who arrived in the United States in February, 1794.
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