19. Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris
n the 7th of May, Congress resolved that a minister plenipotentiary should be appointed in addition to Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams, already in Europe, for negotiating treaties of commerce with foreign nations, and Mr. Jefferson was unanimously elected.
The charge confided to this legation comprehended all our foreign relations, the adjustment of which upon a firm and equitable basis was evidently an undertaking of uncommon magnitude, difficulty, and delicacy. It was the great object of Congress in the appointment of these ambassadors to get our commerce established with every nation on a footing as favorable as that of any other government; and for this purpose, they were directed to propose to each nation a distinct treaty of commerce. The acceptance, too, of such treaties would amount to an acknowledgment by each of our independence and of our reception into the fraternity of nations, "which although," says Mr. Jefferson, "as possessing our station of right and in fact, we would not condescend to ask, we were not unwilling to furnish opportunities for receiving their friendly salutations and welcome." (ME 1:89 With France, the United Netherlands, and Sweden, the United States already had commercial treaties; but commissions were given for those countries also, should any amendments be thought necessary. The other powers to which treaties were to be proposed were England, Hamburg, Saxony, Prussia, Denmark, Russia, Austria, Venice, Rome, Naples, Tuscany, Sardinia, Genoa, Spain, Portugal, the Porte, Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco.
Mr. Jefferson accepted the honorable commission of ambassador and bid a final adieu to Congress on the 11th of May, 1784. Instead of returning to Monticello, the scene of his recent and distressing bereavement, he went directly to Philadelphia, took with him his eldest daughter then in that city, and proceeded to Boston in quest of a passage. This was the only occasion on which Mr. Jefferson ever visited New England, and while pursuing his journey, he made a point of stopping at the principal towns on the seaboard to inform himself of the state of commerce in each State. With the same view, he extended his route into New Hampshire. He returned to Boston and sailed thence on the 5th of July in the merchant ship Ceres bound to Cowes, which is south of England on the Isle of Wight, where he arrived after a pleasant voyage on the 26th. He was detained here a few days by the indisposition of his daughter, when he embarked for Havre and arrived at Paris on the 6th of August. He called immediately on Dr. Franklin at Passy, communicated to him their charge and instructions, and they wrote to Mr. Adams, then at the Hague, to join them in Paris.
The instructions given by Congress to the first plenipotentiaries of independent America were a novelty in the history of international transactions, and much curiosity was manifested by the diplomatic corps of Europe resident at the court of Versailles to know the author of them. These instructions contemplated the introduction of numerous and fundamental reformations in the established relations of neutrals and belligerents which, had the propositions of our ministers been embraced by the principal powers of Europe, would have effected a series of the most substantial and desirable improvements in the international code of mankind. The principal reformations intended were provisions (1) exempting from capture by the public or private armed ships of either belligerent when at war, all merchant vessels and their cargoes employed merely in carrying on the commerce between nations; (2) against the molestation of fishermen, husbandmen, citizens unarmed and following their occupations in unfortified places; (3) for the humane treatment of prisoners of war; (4) for the abolition of contraband of war which exposes merchant vessels to such ruinous detentions and abuses; and (5) for the recognition of the principle of "free bottoms, free goods."
Such were the distinguishing features of these unique instructions, and the interesting question of their authorship had never been settled until the publication of Mr. Jefferson's private correspondence. In a letter of his written but a short time before his death to John Q. Adams, then President of the United States, the whole history of the transaction is concisely stated in answer to a special and friendly enquiry on the subject. He ascribes to Dr. Franklin the merit of having suggested the principal innovations meditated by these instructions.
"I am thankful for the very interesting message and documents of which you have been so kind as to send me a copy, and will state my recollections as to the particular passage of the message to which you ask my attention. On the conclusion of peace, Congress, sensible of their right to assume independence, would not condescend to ask its acknowledgment from other nations, yet were willing by some of the ordinary international transactions to receive what would imply that acknowledgment. They appointed commissioners, therefore, to propose treaties of commerce to the principal nations of Europe. I was then a member of Congress, was of the committee appointed to prepare instructions for the commissioners, was, as you suppose, the draughtsman of those actually agreed to, and was joined with your father and Dr. Franklin to carry them into execution. But the stipulations making part of these instructions which respected privateering, blockades, contraband, and freedom of the fisheries were not original conceptions of mine. They had before been suggested by Dr. Franklin in some of his papers in possession of the public and had, I think, been recommended in some letter of his to Congress. I happen only to have been the inserter of them in the first public act which gave the formal sanction of a public authority." (March 30, 1826. ME 16:160)
Agreeably to their request, Mr. Adams soon joined his colleagues of the legation at Paris, and their first employment was to prepare a general form of treaty based upon the broad principles of their instructions, to be proposed to each nation without discrimination but without urging it upon any. In the conference with the Count de Vergenes, the United States having already concluded a treaty with France, it was mutually agreed to leave to legislative regulation on both sides such modifications of our commercial intercourse as would voluntarily flow from amicable dispositions. They next sounded the ministers of the several European nations assembled at the court of Versailles on the disposition of their respective governments towards mutual commerce and the expediency of encouraging it by the protection of a treaty. The final success of their propositions to the various powers during a twelve months term of joint diplomatic attendance in Europe is very pleasantly and comprehensively stated by Mr. Jefferson himself.
"Old Frederick of Prussia met us cordially and without hesitation, and appointing the Baron de Thulemeyer, his minister at the Hague, to negotiate with us, we communicated to him our Project, which, with little alteration by the King, was soon concluded. Denmark and Tuscany entered also into negotiations with us. Other powers appearing indifferent we did not think it proper to press them. They seemed, in fact, to know little about us but as rebels who had been successful in throwing off the yoke of the mother country. They were ignorant of our commerce, which had been always monopolized by England, and of the exchange of articles it might offer advantageously to both parties. They were inclined, therefore, to stand aloof until they could see better what relations might be usefully instituted with us. The negotiations, therefore, begun with Denmark and Tuscany we protracted designedly until our powers had expired, and abstained from making new propositions to others having no colonies, because our commerce, being an exchange of raw for wrought materials, is a competent price for admission into the colonies of those possessing them: but were we to give it without price to others, all would claim it without price on the ordinary ground of gentis amicissimae." (Autobiography, 1821. ME 1:93)
As might have been foreseen, such was the reserve and hauteur with which the ambassadors of independent America were treated by the representatives of the governments of the ancient world. It is true the United States had just emerged from a subordinate condition; yet a little knowledge of the situation and resources of the people and institutions of America would have apprised them of the rank she was destined to hold in the scale of empire and of the nature of those relations which it was their interest to have established with her. By assuming an air of coyness and indifference, they probably imagined they could inveigle our ministers into terms more advantageous to themselves than they were in the habit of instituting with older countries and more experienced agents. But they were met by the untutored negotiators of republican America with an equal indifference as just and honorable as theirs was fallacious, springing as it did from a sense of the real value of our commerce and a determination not to exchange it in any case without an adequate equivalent. As soon as they became sensible, therefore, that they could do nothing with the greater powers who alone might offer a competent exchange for our commerce, they prudently resolved not to hamper our country with engagements to those of less significance, and accordingly suffered their commission to expire without closing any other negotiation than that with the King of Prussia.
Thus through the short-sighted cupidity of European governments was lost to the world a precious opportunity of commencing a reform in its international code by the introduction of wise and beneficent principles. "Had these governments," says Mr. Jefferson, "been then apprised of the station we should so soon occupy among nations, all, I believe, would have met us promptly and with frankness. These principles would then have been established with all, and from being the conventional law with us alone, would have slid into their engagements with one another and become general. They have not yet found their way into written history; but their adoption by our southern brethren will bring them into observance and make them what they should be: a part of the law of the world and of the reformation of principles for which they will be indebted to us."
n the 10th of March, 1785, Mr. Jefferson received the unanimous appointment of minister plenipotentiary at the court of France as successor to Dr. Franklin, who had obtained leave to return to America. He was re-elected to the same station in October, 1787, on the expiration of his first term, and continued to represent the United States at that court until October, 1789, when he was permitted to return to his native country.Mr. Adams was about the same time appointed minister plenipotentiary to England and left Paris for London in June, 1785.
Mr. Jefferson accepted the appointment with a native diffidence heightened by a sense of the extraordinary merits of his predecessor and of the exalted estimation in which they had established him with the French nation.
His reception at the court of Versailles as resident ambassador of America and his introduction into the brilliant circles of Paris were of the most flattering character. At first, he was universally pointed to and appreciated only as the successor of the admired, the beloved, the venerated Franklin; but in a short time, his own estimable qualities became known and established him in the affections of the nation with a firmness and fervor which rivaled the reputation of his predecessor. He was everywhere and on all occasions greeted with a welcome which evinced their cordial attachment to the freemen and freedom of the United States. With a mind constituted as Mr. Jefferson's was, it is not wonderful that the attentions which were showered upon him, the science of their literary men, the warmth of their general philanthropy, and the devotedness of their select friendships made an impression upon him which he carried in all its freshness to his grave.
On the retirement of Dr. Franklin from the diplomatic field, the duties of the joint commission for forming commercial treaties in Europe devolved on Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Adams, and their separate stations added to their insuperable repugnance to pressing the subject upon the European governments, had almost extinguished the idea of further operations. But in February, 1786, Mr. Jefferson received by express a letter from his colleague in London urging his immediate attendance at that court, stating as a reason that he thought he discovered there some symptoms of a more favorable disposition towards the United States. Col. Smith, his secretary of legation, was the bearer of Mr. Adams' letters. Accordingly, Mr. Jefferson left Paris on the 1st of March for the purpose of cooperating with Mr. Adams in a second attempt to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. On his arrival in London, the two ministers met and agreed on a very summary and liberal form of treaty to be offered, proposing in direct terms a mutual exchange of citizenship, of ships, and of productions generally.
The reader will be amused with Mr. Jefferson's account of the magnanimous reception of their proposition and of the final result of his trip to the dignified court of St. James.
"On my presentation as usual to the King and Queen at their levees, it was impossible for anything to be more ungracious than their notice of Mr. Adams and myself. I saw at once that the ulcerations in the narrow mind of that mulish being left nothing to be expected on the subject of my attendance; and on the first conference with the Marquis of Caermarthen, his Minister of foreign affairs, the distance and disinclination which he betrayed in his conversation, the vagueness and evasions of his answers to us, confirmed me in the belief of their aversion to have anything to do with us. We delivered him however our Projet, Mr. Adams not despairing as much as I did of its effect. We afterwards, by one or more notes, requested his appointment of an interview and conference, which, without directly declining, he evaded by pretenses of other pressing occupations for the moment. After staying there seven weeks, till within a few days of the expiration of our commission, I informed the minister by note that my duties at Paris required my return to that place, and that I should with pleasure be the bearer of any commands to his Ambassador there. He answered that he had none, and wishing me a pleasant journey, I left London the 26th, and arrived at Paris on the 30th of April." (Autobiography, 1821. ME 1:94, corrected)
r. Jefferson's duties while minister plenipotentiary at Paris were principally confined to the subject of our commercial relations with that country, in which he effected many important modifications highly advantageous to the United States. He succeeded in procuring the receipt of our whale oils, salted fish, and salted meats on favorable terms; the admission of our rice on equal terms with that of Piedmont, Egypt, and the Levant; a suppression of the duties on our wheat, flour furs, etc.; the suppression of the monopoly for making and selling spermaceti candles; the naturalization of our ships; a mitigation of the monopoly of our tobacco trade by the farmers-general of France; a reduction of the duties on our tar, pitch, and turpentine; and the free admission of our productions generally into their West India islands. In exchange, the United States received by direct trade the wines, brandies, oils, and productions and manufactures generally of France. These objects were not accomplished, however, without a series of difficult and laborious negotiations aided by the mutual good temper and dispositions of both parties and by the mediation of a powerful auxiliary and friend at that court whose arduous and disinterested services in the cause of America can never be forgotten.
"On these occasions," says he, "I was powerfully aided by all the influence and the energies of the Marquis de Lafayette, who proved himself equally zealous for the friendship and welfare of both nations; and in justice I must also say that I found the government entirely disposed to befriend us on all occasions and to yield us every indulgence not absolutely injurious to themselves. The Count de Vergennes had the reputation with the diplomatic corps of being wary and slippery in his diplomatic intercourse; and so he might be with those whom he knew to be slippery and double-faced themselves. As he saw that I had no indirect views, practised no subtleties, meddled in no intrigues, pursued no concealed object, I found him as frank, as honorable, as easy of access to reason as any man with whom I had ever done business; and I must say the same for his successor Montmorin, one of the most honest and worthy of human beings." (Autobiography, 1821. ME 1:96)
ur commerce in the Mediterranean having at this time been suddenly placed under alarm by the capture of two of our vessels and crews by the Barbary cruisers, Mr. Jefferson projected a coalition of the principal European powers subject to their habitual depredations to compel the piratical States to perpetual peace and to guarantee that peace to each other. He was early and resolutely determined, so far as his opinions could have weight, that the United States would never acquiesce in the "European humiliation," as he termed it, or purchasing their peace of those lawless pirates. "Millions for defense, but not a cent for tribute," was his celebrated motto. The following is a statement of his reasons for this policy, addressed to Mr. Adams soon after returning to Paris with a view to obtain his concurrence in the proposition.
"1. Justice is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will procure us respect in Europe, and respect is a safeguard to interest. 4. It will arm the federal head with the safest of all the instruments of coercion over their delinquent members, and prevent them from using what would be less safe. I think that so far you go with me. But in the next steps we shall differ. 5. I think it least expensive. 6. Equally effectual. I ask a fleet of 150 guns, the one-half of which shall be in constant cruise. This fleet built, manned, and victualed for six months will cost 450,000 pounds sterling. Its annual expense is 300 pounds sterling a gun, including everything; this will be 45,000 pounds sterling a year. I take British experience for the basis of my calculations, though we know from our own experience that we can do in this way for pounds lawful what costs them pounds sterling. Were we to charge all this to the Algerine war, it would amount to little more than we must pay if we buy peace. But as it is proper and necessary that we should establish a small marine force (even were we to buy a peace from the Algerines), and as that force laid up in our dockyards would cost us half as much annually as if kept in order for service, we have a right to say that only 22,500 pounds sterling per annum should be charged to the Algerine war. 6. It will be as effectual. To all the mismanagements of Spain and Portugal urged to shew that war against those people is ineffectual, I urge a single fact to prove the contrary where there is any management. About forty years ago, the Algerines having broke their treaty with France, this court sent M. de Massac with one large and two small frigates; he blockaded the harbor of Algiers three months, and they subscribed to the terms he dictated. If it be admitted, however, that war on the fairest prospects is still exposed to uncertainties, I weigh against this the greater uncertainty of the duration of a peace bought with money from such a people, from a Dey eighty years old, and by a nation who, on the hypothesis of buying peace, is to have no power on the sea to enforce an observance of it.
So far, I have gone on the supposition that the whole weight of this war would rest on us. But, 1. Naples will join us. The character of their naval minister (Acton), his known sentiments with respect to the peace Spain is officiously trying to make for them and his dispositions against the Algerines give the greatest reason to believe it. 2. Every principle of reason tells us Portugal will join us. I state this as taking for granted what all seem to believe: that they will not be at peace with Algiers. I suppose then that a Convention might be formed between Portugal, Naples and the U.S. by which the burthen of the war might be shared with them according to their respective wealth, and the term of it should be when Algiers should subscribe to a peace with all three on equal terms. This might be left open for other nations to accede to, and many if not most of the powers of Europe (except France, England, Holland and Spain, if her peace be made) would sooner or later enter into the confederacy for the sake of having their peace with the piratical states guaranteed by the whole. I suppose that in this case our proportion of force would not be the half of what I first calculated on." (July 11, 1786. ME 5:364)
Presuming on Mr. Adam's concurrence and without waiting his answer, Mr. Jefferson immediately draughted and proposed to the diplomatic corps at Paris for consultation with their respective governments, articles of special confederation and alliance against the Barbary powers, the substance of which was that the parties should become mutually bound to compel these powers to perpetuate peace without price and to guarantee that peace to each other, the burden of the war to be equitably apportioned among them.
The proposition was received with applause by Portugal, Naples, the two Sicilies, Venice, Malta, Denmark, and Sweden. Spain had just concluded a treaty with Algiers at the expense of three million dollars and was indisposed to relinquish the benefit of her engagement until a first infraction by the other party, when she was ready to join. Mr. Jefferson had previously sounded the dispositions of the Count de Vergennes, and although France was at peace by a mercenary tenure with the Barbary States and fears were entertained that she would secretly give them her aid, he did not think it proper, in his conference with that minister, to insinuate a doubt of the fair conduct of his government. But on stating to him the proposition, he mentioned that apprehensions were felt that England would interfere in behalf of the piratical powers. "She dares not do it," was his reply. Mr. Jefferson pressed the point no further. The other ministers were satisfied with this indication of the sentiments of France, and nothing was now wanting to bring the measure into direct consideration but the assent of the United States and their authority to make the formal stipulation.
Mr. Jefferson communicated to Congress the favorable prospect of protecting their commerce from the Barbary depredations and for such a term of time as by an exclusion of them from the sea would change their characters from a predatory to an agricultural people; towards which, however, should the measure be approved, it was expected they would contribute a frigate and its expenses for constant cruise. But the United States were in no condition to unite in such an undertaking. The powers of Congress over the people for obtaining contributions being merely recommendatory and openly disregarded by the States, they declined entering into an engagement which they were conscious they could not fulfil with punctuality. The association consequently fell through; but the principle thereafter governed in the American councils.
The remaining public objects of importance which engaged his attention were: 1st, The settlement of the financial concerns with our bankers in France and Holland, which were in a most critical and embarrassing state. Owing to the partial suspension in the action of our government while passing from the confederation to the constitutional form, the credit of the nation stood at one time on the verge of bankruptcy. Seeing there was not a moment to lose, Mr. Jefferson went directly to Holland, joined Mr. Adams at the Hague, where, without instructions and at their own risk, they executed bonds for a million of florins and pledged the credit of the United States in security for three years to come, by which time they thought the new government would get fairly underway. 2nd, The conclusion of a consular convention with France based upon republican principles. 3rd, The restoration of certain prizes taken from the British during the war, recaptured by Denmark, and delivered up to the British. He instituted measures to recover indemnification from Denmark, but the negotiation, by unavoidable circumstances, was spun out beyond the term of his ministry. 4th, The redemption of American citizens taken captive by the Algerines, and the formation of treaties with the Barbary States. The inability of the United States to supply him with the necessary funds prevented the redemption of the Algerine captives until after his return from France, and the only treaty which he succeeded in concluding with the Barbary States was that with the government of Morocco.
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